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A B S T R A C T
We investigate the impact and the possible consequences of the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Wemodel the European gas network as a cooperative game between regions as players over the pipeline network.Our model offers several novelties compared to earlier cooperative studies. Firstly, we focus on cost savingrather than on the profits of cooperation. Secondly, we introduce liquefied natural gas as a player. Thirdly,we apply an iterative linear program to account for the long term bilateral contracts that still drive the gasmarket. This modelling technique also allows us to identify individual gas flows. We focus on the change ofinfluence of the players in three different scenarios. We investigate how the power of the agents shift whenthe Nord Stream pipeline is expanded, when the Ukrainian pipeline is shut down and finally when both ofthese happen. Our calculations show that when Nord Stream 2 is operational, Russia and Western Europeimprove their position compared to the base scenario, while other suppliers, notably Norway, together withCentral- Eastern- and Southern Europe suffer losses, especially when the Ukrainian route is dismissed. Theresults highlight that both the supporters and adversaries of Nord Stream 2 are governed by self-interest andsolidarity and trust, the values proclaimed by the EU and the Energy Union, remain but a slogan.
1. Introduction
Satisfying Europe’s hunger for energy has always been a difficulty.Despite efforts to increase the use of renewable sources, with themounting sentiment against nuclear energy, reliance on fossil fuelsis more important than ever. Natural gas is, in particular, a veryversatile energy source with extensive industrial and domestic uses.Nearly three-quarters of the European Unions natural gas consumptionis imported and 40% of the total import comes from Russia (EuropeanCommission, 2014).To combat this weakness, the European Union (EU) has establisheda strategic plan for secure, affordable and environmental-friendly en-ergy for all its citizens. As part of this plan, the Third Energy Package,adopted in 2009, has the goal to open up the internal electricity andgas markets of the European Union. It pushes for a separation of energyproduction and transmission, stipulates the establishment of nationalregulatory authorities and creates the Agency for the Cooperation ofEnergy Regulators. Solidarity in energy matters is a key point in theTreaty on the Functioning of the European Union as well as in the
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Energy Union. In fact, the first point of the EU’s energy union strategyis: security, solidarity and trust.1 In the 2014 Energy Security StrategyCommunication the European Commission clearly declared how thisshould be interpreted.
‘‘Government interventions that affect this market framework, suchas national decisions on renewable energy or efficiency targets,decisions to support investment in (or decommissioning of) nucleargeneration, or decisions to support key infrastructure projects (suchas Nord Stream, South Stream, TAP or a Baltic LNG terminal) needto be discussed at European and/or regional level to ensure thatdecisions in one member state do not undermine security of supplyin another member state’’. (European Commission, 2014)
Natural gas is commonly transported via a network of nationaland international pipelines. The Nord Stream pipeline, which connectsRussia and Germany, respectively the largest supplier and consumerin Europe, became operational in 2011. Nord Stream 1 has alreadyled to political tensions within the EU: Central European Member
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States viewed it as a Trojan horse, a way to undermine the region’sdiversification efforts (European Policy Strategy Centre, 2016). TheEU introduced restrictions allowing the pipeline to be utilized at only27.5 from 55 billion cubic metres (bcm) or half of its capacity. Re-cently the limitations were lifted, utilization reached 93% by 2017 andnegotiations started to double transmission capacity to 110 bcm.By August 2018, the project received permits from Russia, Finland,Sweden and Germany, but not yet from Denmark. To prevent fur-ther delay, Gazprom identified an alternative route avoiding Danishterritorial waters and started the construction. A year later, threequarters of the work was completed and soon Denmark gave consentto construct the pipeline through her continental shelf area. Meanwhilethe US threatened participating companies with sanctions and as a finaltwist Swiss pipelay contractor Allseas halted work. Gazprom remainedadamant that they will find a solution to complete the pipeline. Westudy the consequences of opening Nord Stream 2.Propagators of Nord Stream 2 argue that the project is commerciallyviable.
⊕ Declining European production capacities cannot meet rising netdemand.
⊕ Nord Stream 2 helps to lower gas prices in the EU.
⊕ Key pipelines in Ukraine are reaching the end of their service lifeand lack viable alternatives.
⊕ Ends the uncertainty of the Ukrainian transit route.
What are the main arguments against the project?
⊖ Does not diversify the EU’s energy supply.
⊖ Adds to an infrastructure overcapacity in the EU.
⊖ Undermines the economic sanctions towards Russia.
⊖ Incompatible with the Energy Union’s strategic goals and with theThird Energy Package.
Let us elaborate on the above points.The demand for natural gas has declined in Europe during the 2010–2013 period largely due to the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequentrecession and the migration of manufacturing industry to other worldregions, but the lack of population growth and high prices have alsocontributed to the effect. Although there is currently an oversupply inthe market, the trend has already reversed. Asia continuously divertsthe LNG production surplus, while the US shale gas with its highvariable cost and high sensitivity to LNG market prices cannot currentlycompete with the cheap Russian gas. The International Energy Agency(2017) forecasts flat demand and an average annual decline of −2.5%for European production. This amounts up to 34 bcm deficit in the2017–2022 period and possible more in the future. Nord Stream 2 aimsto close this gap.Russia claims that renovating Ukrainian lines would cost more than
e9.5 bn, the construction cost of Nord Stream 2 (National EnergySecurity Fund, 2016). The new route is shorter and more efficient dueto the inner pipeline coating which reduces friction and lowers theamount of compression needed to push the gas through (Barnes, 2017).Furthermore, alternatives, such as the planned Southern Gas Corridor,connecting Azerbaijan to Europe, are too small to make any difference.As a result of lower average EU gas prices, Hecking and Weiser (2017)forecast a e13–35 bn annual welfare benefit for the EU-28.Gazprom has also obtained half of the funds from five Europeanenergy companies, suggesting that these firms also expect profits, al-though four of them (Uniper and Wintershall from Germany, Engiefrom France, and Shell from United Kingdom/Netherlands) are basedin countries that are clear beneficiaries of the project (cf. Table 3; thefifth firm being the Austrian OMV).
On the other hand, Nord Stream 2 received harsh criticism fromboth sides of the Atlantic. In March 2016, eight EU leaders, the primeministers of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slo-vakia and Romania and the president of Lithuania have signed a letterwarning that Nord Stream 2 would generate ‘‘potentially destabilizinggeopolitical consequences’’. A European Parliament resolution adoptedin the same year describes Nord Stream 2 as harmful to energy security,diversification and European solidarity (European Economic and SocialCommittee, 2016). According to the European Policy Strategy Centre(2016), the European Commission’s in-house think tank ‘‘Nord Stream2, seen from a common EU perspective, is a project with neithereconomic rationale nor political backing’’, furthermore the project farexceeds the renovation costs of the Ukrainian route at e6 bn. Riley(2016) argues that Nord Stream 2 threatens to plunge the CentralEastern European states back into a pre-2004 market of greater supplysecurity risk and greater Russian leverage in their markets. Similarconcerns were raised before the construction of Nord Stream 1 andthese turned out to be well-founded. While Nord Stream 1 broughtnew supplies to compensate declining internal production, EU officialsdocumented various abusive practices of Gazprom’s market power,primarily in Eastern Europe (European Commission, 2018).Ukraine alone is to lose an estimated $2 billion from transfer feesand, to a lesser extent, the EU members Slovakia, Hungary and Polandwould be also harmed by Nord Stream 2 (Fischer, 2016) — violatingthe principle of solidarity of Treaty on the Functioning of the EuropeanUnion. The European Commission has therefore proposed to explicitlyextend EU internal energy market rules to cover offshore gas pipelines.The legal services of the Council of the European Union – where,incidentally, the constructing countries have a blocking minority – hasopposed the legislative proposal. Eventually a compromise was reachedin February, 2019. Although the adopted text is less clear-cut thanthe original proposal had been, it is the first document declaring theUnion’s jurisdiction over Nord Stream 2. It asserts, that the Mem-ber State with the first interconnection point is primarily responsiblefor applying EU rules on pipelines with third countries. The legalframework for the entire pipeline will be established either throughbilateral German–Russian talks or an intergovernmental agreementbetween the EU and Russia, negotiated by Germany or the EuropeanCommission (Łoskot-Strachota, 2019).There is already an infrastructure overcapacity in the EU in thesense that imports amount to less than half of the existing infras-tructure capacity (European Policy Strategy Centre, 2016). FinishingNord Stream 2 and Turkstream, Russia’s overall export capacity of340.5 bcm (198.5 bcm without the Ukrainian corridor) will tower overthe 161 bcm of estimated upper limit of her exports to the region in2025 (Vatansever, 2017). Nord Stream 2 does not diversify the EU’senergy supply neither from an energy source perspective nor from aroute perspective as (i) Russia is already the main supplier of Europeand (ii) the pipeline would lead to a concentration of routes in the Balticcorridor. Similar concerns have been expressed by senior figures in theUS administration — although they are hardly impartial as Europe isa prime target for future shale gas exports. Vainio (2019a,b) on theother hand looks at energy transformation to renewables and the risksrelated to ‘‘geopolitical changes in countries dependent on fossil fuelproduction’’ Vainio (2018), that is, — sine nomine — Russia.Both narratives have compelling elements, and both are true tosome extent (see Goldthau, 2016 for a more in-depth analysis). AsFischer (2016) put it, the EU has to decide on what should drive itsnatural gas policies: the market approach or the geopolitical approach.In this paper, we aim to answer whether the concerns are well-foundedor not. We model the European gas network as a cooperative gameand numerically assess the influence of the stakeholders in the differentscenarios.The structure of the paper is accordingly. After a brief literatureoverview, we introduce our model, and explain the limitations. Nextwe discuss the data we have used and present the main findings.Finally, we discuss the possible network development alternatives inthe conclusion.
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2. Literature overview
The cooperative game theoretic approach in studying natural gasnetworks was pioneered by Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011), and wassoon followed by a number of papers that analysed different segmentsof the European and Central Asian markets. Roson and Hubert (2015)presents a detailed discussion of bargaining games on network markets.Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011) analyse how Russian natural gasreaches the European market through the Eastern-European gas net-work, and derived bargaining powers by calculating the Shapley-valuesfor the stakeholders. The scope of the paper is limited to seven coun-tries, among which Russia was the only supplier. Hubert and Coblani(2015) extend this framework to a full scale analysis of the Euro-pean network comparing three scenarios corresponding to the NordStream 1, Nabucco, and the South Stream pipeline projects. Theyconstruct a cooperative game by calculating profits of coalitions. Incontrast, we focus on how much cost a coalition can save by cooper-ation. An even more important difference is that instead of optimizingthe network flows of a coalition in one step, we do it iteratively,country-by-country according to a given order. We do this in orderto obtain a more fitting model of the gas market with predominantlylong term bilateral contracts. One advantage of this approach is thatflows corresponding to the consumption of individual countries arewell-defined.Cobanli (2014) also uses the cooperative approach to assess thebargaining power of Central Asian countries. He considers variousprojects, both East- and Westbound,2 and concludes that there is nodemand competition between Europe and China. To deal with theexternalities raised by the third-party-access policy imposed by theEU regulations, Csercsik et al. (2019) replace the characteristic formapproach and represent the game in partition function form (Kóczy,2018).Among other approaches Holz et al. (2008) and recently Abadaet al. (2013) consider strategic, while others highly detailed numericalmodels including the EUGAS model by Perner and Seeliger (2004);the TIGER model developed by EWI Institute in Cologne (Petrovichet al., 2016; Lochner, 2011); the ambitious Global Gas Model (Egginget al., 2010). A non-linear model is presented by Bouwmeester andOosterhaven (2017).Additionally, there is a handful of papers that offer scenario analy-ses or consider the potential impact of new pipelines: Mitrova et al.(2016) reviews a number of scenarios, including the disruption ofthe Ukrainian transit, and conclude that the European gas mix isfairly robust, and will include a significant share of natural gas fromRussia in all studied scenarios. Richter and Holz (2015) also analysesRussian natural gas supply disruption scenarios using the Global GasModel. Dastan (2018) investigates the bargaining positions of Rus-sia and Turkey in view of the Turkstream (formerly Turkish Stream)project. Aune et al. (2017) use the numerical energy market modelLIBEMOD to investigate long-run effects of increased export capacity ofpiped Russian gas. They find that the projects Nord Stream 2, TurkishStream and Power of China all lead to moderate increases in net totalRussian export, but the increases are lower than the capacities of thenew pipelines.
3. Model
In this section we describe our model. We are interested in cal-culating the values of countries or country-groups, representing theirbargaining power. First, we shortly define the cooperative game the-oretic framework, and the Shapley value. Following this, we describeour modelling assumptions, and discuss how the coalitional values aredetermined in our case.
2 Including the TAP, TANAP and TCP projects, which we also review inSection 7.
3.1. Coalitional cooperative games
The bargaining between a buyer and a seller – or a consumer anda producer – is best modelled by a cooperative game. When we havemore buyers and/or sellers we may also want to consider trades amongmore than two players, especially when the transmission of the goodsmust also be taken into account. Such trading groups are coalitions andthe members are the players. Of course, we can consider the possibletrade with any group or coalition of players — the realized utility iscalled the characteristic value of the coalition.Formally, the characteristic function 𝑣 ∶ 2𝑁 → R, where 𝑁 isthe set of players, gives the value a coalition is able to obtain viacooperation without the help or participation of players outside thecoalition. One-member coalitions are termed singletons.In our case, the values of the coalitions will be defined as thesavings resulting from transporting (trading) gas within the coalition.We interpret these savings in the following context. We assume thatevery consumer node of the network has a given (inelastic) demandfor gas. If this is not fully supplied, it must use its (expensive) backstopsource: alternative energy sources (renewables, coal, etc.), or alterna-tive technologies requiring less energy. The backstop source can also beinterpreted as the cost of government intervention to mitigate damagesdue to the gas shortage. The gain of a coalition is then the cost savingfrom consuming natural gas instead of the expensive backstop source.The cost function 𝑐 ∶ 2𝑁 → R assigns a non-negative value to eachcoalition, the cost of supplying that coalition using only the networkconnections and resources that are available within this coalition. Then
𝑣(𝑆) =
∑
𝑖∈𝑆
𝑐 ({𝑖}) − 𝑐(𝑆), (1)
that is, the difference between the cost of coalition 𝑆 and the totalcost of its members as singletons (when consumers use their backstopsources).Later in Section 3.5 we describe the details how the cost savings arecalculated for each coalition, and in Section 3.6 we provide an exampleof how these values are calculated in the case of a simple network. Inthe next subsection, we introduce the Shapley-value, which representsthe bargaining power of individual payers in a characteristic functionform cooperative game.
3.2. The Shapley-value
Usually, full cooperation is the most beneficial scenario for the play-ers (that is players are expected to form the so-called grand coalition,
𝑁). On the other hand, it is not trivial how the gains of 𝑣(𝑁) aredivided.The share a player manages to secure from the value of the grandcoalition 𝑣(𝑁) can be considered as an indicator of power. We discussdifferent solution concepts in Section 6.3. In general, more successfula player is in generating value for himself or others, the more he inentitled from the whole cake.In consumers-only coalitions there is no cost saving, each playeruses its backstop source. Similarly, without consumers there is noopportunity for cost saving. Finally, in mixed coalitions, suppliers andconsumers without connections cannot reduce costs. Consequently,when a player joins a coalition, his contributions can be one or moreof the following types: production, consumption and transit.
1. A new, inexpensive gas source is the most obvious way to reducecosts by replacing some of the more expensive sources. By ourassumption, all players can satisfy demand by alternative energyforms if no gas is available, so the first contribution is to replacethese alternative forms.2. Producers cannot reduce costs unless there is demand. A con-sumer would normally use its own backstop sources; in cooper-ation these backstop sources are replaced by natural gas, therebysaving costs. Therefore consumer countries create value (i.e. costsaving) by having a demand that can be satisfied.
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3. Finally, gas must travel from producers to consumers. By linkingthem, transit countries make the aforementioned savings possi-ble. For existing routes, a less expensive alternative may alsoreduce costs.
When a coalition forms, members join one-by-one, and each mem-ber contributes a non-negative amount to the cost saving. Existingmembers are not harmed if (almost all) of this saving is kept by the newentrant. Considering all possible orders we can calculate the averagemarginal contribution to the cost saving of each of the members ofthe coalition. This is known as the Shapley-value (Shapley, 1953).Formally, the Shapley-value of a player 𝑖, denoted by 𝜙𝑖(𝑣) can becalculated as follows:
𝜙𝑖(𝑣) =
∑
𝑆⊂𝑁,𝑆∌𝑖
|𝑆|! (|𝑁 ⧵ 𝑆| − 1)!|𝑁|! (𝑣(𝑆 ∪ {𝑖}) − 𝑣(𝑆)) (2)
where |𝑆| denotes the number of players in coalition 𝑆.What do the Shapley-values tell us in our context? As our game willrepresent natural gas trading on the European network, the Shapley-values are the expected contributions of players to savings in the entireEuropean market. Regarding on consumers, the saving originates partlyfrom replacing the backstop source by cheaper gas and is partly fromhelping others to save by providing transit lines. In the latter case partof the saving is kept as a transit fee, which comes on top of the transfercosts and can be seen as the profit of the transit operation. Both reducecosts and with some simplification we can say that a higher Shapley-value implies cheaper gas in a region. Much of the value is, howeveris simply due to the size of countries. It is more interesting to see howthe power distribution changes with the network: what is the effect ofnew pipelines built, who gain and who lose with them. Similarly, theclosing of certain pipelines may harm some, but may benefit others.
3.3. Modelling assumptions
In this subsection, we summarize the assumptions, which are usedthrough the modelling calculations.
Players. We identify the stakeholders of the gas market with countries,represented by nodes in the graph of the pipeline network correspond-ing to the main distribution hubs. Considering the strategic importanceof managing gas supply it seems fair to assume that production, trans-portation and consumption are coordinated at the national level in eachcountry and is also in line with the strive for national energy authoritiesas stipulated by the Third Energy Package. Note that the legislativenegotiations within the EU concerning the regulation of Nord Stream 2also took place on a country level.
Demand. For each node, we assume a non-negative perfectly inelasticdemand (zero for source nodes).
Regions. For computational reasons – the calculation of the Shapley-value is factorial (cf. Eq. (2)) – we need to simplify the player set.We assume that certain countries always act together: join or leavecoalitions collectively. Players may then represent individual countriesor regions consisting of multiple nodes of the network. The latter isan important point: The underlying pipeline network is unaffected;supplies, demands and eventual flows are considered for each membercountry separately.
Ordered players. We assume that suppliers focus first on the largestmarkets that provide the largest part of their revenues: countries withhigher demand have, effectively, priority over countries who importless gas. In the context of our model, this implies that ‘large’ playersgrab the less expensive sources and the remaining supply (and transmis-sion capacity) is shared among the rest. We formalize this assumptionin Section 3.5 and check for robustness in 6.2.
Transportation costs. Pipelines constitute the other component of thenetwork. While there may be specific costs to using each pipeline, weassume that the transportation costs are uniform, proportional to thevolume and to the length of the pipeline (1.5 m$/bcm/100 km). Havinga fixed number is convenient both for estimation, but is also in linewith the mid-term goals in the European Union to liberalize access to(international) pipelines.
Sourcing costs. In order to calculate the cost savings we specify theproduction or sourcing cost for the suppliers and the price of thealternative or backstop source for consumers. We use expert estimationsfor sourcing costs; we assume that the Russian gas is somewhat cheaperthan the Norwegian and North-African gas. The price of the backstopsource is uniform across all consumers and is 2–3 times higher than thesourcing cost. Our robustness analysis in Section 6.2 includes sensitivitychecks to sourcing costs and backstop prices.
Quality. We assume that the natural gas transported over the net-work is homogeneous. Gas coming from different sources will differ incalorific value by up to 10% (Chandra, 2006, Chapter 1). Interestingly,consumers pay for the energy content, while for transportation capaci-ties and costs the volume must be considered. As a result better qualitygas is a little less costly to transport. Taking calorific capacities intoaccount seems feasible, but transporting gases of different qualities overthe same pipeline segment can be difficult. Either we have to handle‘cocktails’ or add a complex scheduling problem. Cancelling counter-directional flows over the same pipeline is problematic if we do notassume homogeneous gas sources, as the gas quality may not be thesame.Now we move on to the technical details of our model.
3.4. Model formulation
We consider the European natural gas pipeline network as a graph,where each country is represented by a node and the pipelines connect-ing countries are the arcs of the network. The set of nodes is denotedby 𝑉 , |𝑉 | = 𝑛 with a generic element denoted by 𝑖 or 𝑗. The set ofarcs is denoted by 𝐿, |𝐿| = 𝑚 with generic element 𝓁. The player set isdenoted by 𝑁 , a generic coalition by 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁 . When 𝑁 is considered as acoalition, we refer to it as the grand coalition. A player may correspondto multiple nodes in the network.Now, we turn to the physical characteristics of the network. Thenetwork itself is described by an incidence matrix 𝐴 ∈ R𝑛×𝑚 where
𝐴𝑖𝓁 = −1 and 𝐴𝑗𝓁 = 1 means that arc 𝓁 runs from node 𝑖 to 𝑗.Edges, representing the pipelines are characterized by a maximaltransfer capacity. The vector of transfer capacities is denoted by 𝑞.Transporting gas over these pipelines has its costs. A pipeline maytravel across several regions and therefore it is convenient to definecosts by a cost matrix 𝐶 ∈ R𝑛×𝑚+ where 𝐶𝑖𝑗 is the cost of transferring aunit gas over pipeline 𝑗 occurring in region 𝑖.Each node is characterized by exogenous or perfectly inelastic de-mand and a production value, 𝑑0 ∈ R𝑛+ denotes the vector of demandsand 𝑠0 ∈ R𝑛+ the vector of (maximum) supplies. In the following wemodify these to obtain the net demand and net production vectors,
𝑑, 𝑠 ∈ R𝑛+: There are fundamentally two types of regions: those wherethe production capacity is higher than the domestic demand and thosewhere it is not. In the first group we assume that domestic consumptionis fully satisfied by domestic production, and domestic production isreduced by this amount. In the latter the domestic consumption usesup all the production and the net import is the remaining part. Hence,we define
𝑑𝑖 = (𝑑0𝑖 − 𝑠
0
𝑖 )
+ and 𝑠𝑖 = |||𝑑0𝑖 − 𝑠0𝑖 ||| (3)where (⋅)+ denotes the positive part, that is (𝑥)+ = max{𝑥, 0} for any
𝑥 ∈ R. Note, that if 𝑑0𝑖 > 𝑠0𝑖 , then country 𝑖 has no real excess supply,still 𝑠𝑖 is positive. We will come back to this issue in a moment.
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As mentioned in Section 3.1, we assume that countries that do notreceive enough gas to satisfy their demand use some kind of backstopsource: We model it by providing the countries with a virtual energysource that can satisfy all residual demand, but this alternative is moreexpensive.Production has different costs in different countries, in particular,the backstop energy source has a unit price ?̄? that is (much) higherthan the cost at any of the producers. The price of producing oneunit of gas is called the sourcing cost and is represented by a vector
𝑝 ∈ R𝑛+. For consumer countries, where demand exceeds domesticsupply capacities, 𝑝𝑖 is set to ?̄? — the price of the backstop energysource. That is, consumer countries also have supply capacities (that isthe reason we defined 𝑠𝑖 as |||𝑑0𝑖 − 𝑠0𝑖 |||), but they can produce gas only forthe price of the backstop source (?̄?/bcm). This technical detail ensuresthat each country can satisfy its own demand albeit in this case at ahigher price.
3.5. Optimal flows
In this subsection, we describe how the cost saving of a coalition isdetermined as gas trade takes place on the available pipelines. The firstbest approach would be to minimize the overall cost of satisfying alldemand. This can be done by transporting supplied gas to the demandsites via the cheapest available route, but more expensive sources,routes or even backstop sources may be used due to bottlenecks ofproduction or transportation capacities.Under the optimum, which describes the cheapest possible supplyof a given coalition, the flow over the pipelines is given, but in the caseof multiple sources or consumption sites and branching flows it is notclear which gas molecules turn left or right at a node. Hence, we cannotnecessarily distinguish between the flows of individual countries.The approach we opted for resolves this issue. As foreshadowed inSection 3.3, we assume that producers supply the larger consumersfirst. In practice, this means that ‘large’ players grab the less expen-sive sources and the remaining supply – and transmission capacity– is shared among the rest. As a result, we may run out of transfercapacity too soon making some smaller players unable to use optimal,inexpensive sources. The overall cost will therefore increase, givingus a second best solution: In the order of demand, countries satisfytheir needs at the lowest possible cost using the available sources andtransport capacities; this consumption is removed from the market andfor the next player the flows are calculated using residual productionand transfer capacities and so on.Similar calculations are also possible when only a subset 𝑆 ofplayers participate in the network transfer. In this case the optimizationis restricted to the supply of the elements of 𝑆 using the productionand transportation capacities of 𝑆. The latter condition also impliesthat only pipelines where both endpoints belong to the coalition can beused. We do not exclude pipelines that travel through regions belongingto a third party. Using these calculations the total cost of supplying thecoalition can be determined. Comparing this cost to the individual (sin-gleton) costs of gas supply we obtain the cost saving due to cooperation.The flow chart of this calculation process is shown in Fig. 1.The iterative method we described here stands in contrast withthe approach of Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011), Hubert and Coblani(2015) and Cobanli (2014), where the optimal flows for each coalitionis calculated in one step. The natural gas market is driven by long-termcontracts. Suppliers negotiate with each consumer one-by-one. Here weassume that bigger markets have priority over smaller ones. In case ofa capacity shortage this seemingly technical detail makes a difference.In addition, we can distinguish between the flows of each player, evenwhen they are integrated in a coalition. Hence, the individual cost canbe accounted for, which is helpful if we want to keep track which regionbenefits from the cheap Russian gas.Note that because of the ordering the game is not superadditive,that is there might exists some coalitions, 𝑆, 𝑇 such that 𝑆 ∩𝑇 = ∅ and
𝑣(𝑆) + 𝑣(𝑇 ) > 𝑣(𝑆 ∪ 𝑇 ). The intuitive explanation is that, when a playerwith higher priority joins a coalition, he may request that some cheapgas previously supplied to a lower priority player should be delivered tohim. Although the amount of gas that is replaced by the backstop sourcemight not change, the overall cost of the coalition could decrease,because the route from the supplier to the high priority player is longerand more costly than the route to the low priority paper.In the following, we define the formalism required for the determi-nation of the cheapest possible supply of a coalition: the solution of alinear programming (LP) problem. Readers who are less interested inmathematical details should note that the following description is justa simple flow model with multiple sources and sinks.Formally, let 𝑓+𝓁 ∈ R+ denote the flow in the positive direction overedge 𝓁, and let 𝑓−𝓁 ∈ R+ denote flow in the opposite direction, 𝑓+ is thevector of positive directional flows on all edges while 𝑓− is the vectorof negative directional flows on all edges. Let 𝐼 ∈ R𝑛+ denote the inletvalues at the nodes. The variable vector is then
𝑥 =
⎛⎜⎜⎝
𝑓+
𝑓−
𝐼
⎞⎟⎟⎠ ∈ R2𝑚+𝑛+ . (4)
Let 𝑒𝑖 and 𝑒𝑆 denote 𝑛-dimensional indicator vectors for player 𝑖 andcoalition 𝑆, respectively:
𝑒𝑖𝑘 =
{
1 if 𝑘 = 𝑖
0 otherwise and 𝑒𝑆𝑘 =
{
1 if 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆
0 otherwise.
Let 𝐸𝑆 denote a diagonal matrix with 𝑒𝑆 over the diagonal, let 1𝑛 denotean 𝑛-dimensional vector of 1’s, let 𝐼𝑘×𝑘 denote a 𝑘 dimensional identitymatrix, and let 0𝑘×𝑙 denote a 𝑘 × 𝑙-dimensional 0 matrix.We now describe the linear programming problem and then inter-pret the constraints. We minimize the cost of supplying player 𝑖 incoalition 𝑆:
min
𝑥
(
1⊤𝑛 𝐶 1
⊤
𝑛 𝐶 𝑝
⊤) 𝑥 (5)
such that[
𝐴 𝐴 𝐸𝑆
]
𝑥 = 𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑖 (6)
𝐼𝑗 ≤ 𝑠𝑗 (7)(
𝐼2𝑚×2𝑚 02𝑚×𝑛
)
𝑥 ≤
(
𝑞+
𝑞−
) (8)
𝑥 ≥ 0 (9)
The objective function and the constraints are, actually, ratherstraightforward. We want to minimize the total cost that is the sumof the transportation costs in the positive direction, the transportationcosts in the negative direction and the cost of gas itself. Naturally, gasdoes not flow over the same pipeline in both directions, it is only forthe purposes of calculation that we separated the two flows. The firstconstraint explains that no gas is lost at any of the nodes: the totalof inputs, inflows, outflows must add up to the consumption (𝑑𝑖) thatis zero except for player 𝑖. Inlets cannot exceed the supply capacities.The last condition merely insists on positivity. Finally constraint (8) ex-plains that the flows must not exceed transmission capacities. Initially,3we set 𝑞+ = 𝑞− = 𝑞. Then in each round we recalculate the capacities. Ifover pipeline 𝑗 the two capacities have been 𝑞+𝑗 and 𝑞−𝑗 and a flow 𝑓 wasallocated, then the capacity in the positive direction becomes smaller:
𝑞+𝑗 − 𝑓 , but at the same time the capacity in the opposite direction hasbeen expanded to 𝑞−𝑗 + 𝑓 . The reason is that any flow in the oppositedirection would be realized by reducing flow in this direction. This, of
3 Each pipeline has a characteristic transmission capacity in each direction:these are rarely symmetric. We could use these different capacities. Note,however, that necessary compression facilities to inverse the flow can be builtat a relatively small cost. We therefore chose to consider the maximum of thetwo capacities and calculate less constrained optima.
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Fig. 1. Flow chart of the iterative flow calculations for a given coalition.
course relies on the assumption that gas is commodity where moleculesare not labelled. We return to this assumption in the last section.Let us summarize how the value of coalition 𝑣(𝑆), is computed.
1. For each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 we compute the country’s singleton cost 𝑐(𝑖),which is just ?̄? times its net consumption 𝑑𝑖.2. In the predefined order (which depends on 𝑑𝑖) we compute theindividual costs of the countries using the above LP iteratively.After each iteration we update the network (i.e. the flows andcapacities).3. We set 𝑣(𝑆) = ∑𝑖∈𝑆 𝑐({𝑖}) − 𝑐(𝑆) where 𝑐(𝑆) is the sum of theindividual costs computed in Step 2.
3.6. Numerical example
Let us see an example how this works in practice. Consider thenetwork depicted by Fig. 2, where each node represents a country.
Four players are involved in this game, two suppliers 𝑆1, 𝑆2, and twoconsumers 𝐶1, 𝐶2. Note that 𝐶1 is an aggregated region consisting oftwo countries. The numbers inside the nodes represent the priorityordering of the consumers, based on the decreasing ordering of theirconsumption values (100, 60 and 40 respectively), as described in Sec-tion 3.3. The numbers below the nodes show the available gas capacityof the country in bcm. Positive gas capacity shows that the countryis a supplier, while negative gas capacity means that the country is aconsumer. The numbers above the nodes represent the sourcing cost,or – in case of consumer countries – the price of the backstop source(in m$s). To make things simple each pipeline has unlimited transfercapacity and uniform transportation cost: 10 m$/bcm.Let us see how the worth of the grand coalition (𝑁) is calculated.First we look at the individual costs denoted by 𝑐({𝑖}) in Eq. (1),which serve as reference in the process of determining the value of the
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Fig. 2. Example of a gas network game. Numbers below the nodes correspond to production/consumption amounts, while numbers above the nodes correspond toproduction/backstop prices.
coalition. These cost are
𝑐(𝐶1) = (100 + 40) ⋅ 300 = 42000
𝑐(𝐶2) = 60 ⋅ 300 = 18000
Thus the sum of the individual costs is 60 000 (suppliers have a cost of0). As we consider the grand coalition, each pipeline and gas sourceis available for the consumers. Consumer countries are served in theirorder of priority.The left node of 𝐶1 is the largest consumer and the first in the order-ing. This node imports 100 units of gas from the cheapest source 𝑆1 for125 m$/bcm (105 m$/bcm sourcing cost + 20 m$/bcm transportationcost).In the case of this simple example, the calculations of optimal flowsfor the individual nodes are trivial, in general, this is done via solvingthe LP described in Eqs. (5)–(9).Node 𝐶2, the second in the ordering, imports 20 bcm from 𝑆1 andthe rest (as 𝑆1 is depleted) from 𝑆2. The problem is that the capacity of
𝐶2−𝐶1 pipeline is used in the reverse direction. The network operatorssolve this by letting less amount of gas through, that is, 𝐶2 and theleftmost node of 𝐶1 exchange gas molecules (but not suppliers). Thistechnicality does not affect the import cost, which is 20 ⋅ (105+10)+40 ⋅
(120 + 20) = 7900 m$/bcm. Finally, the rightmost node of 𝐶1 importsfrom 𝑆2 for 40 ⋅ (120 + 20) = 5600 m$/bcm. The total cost and thecharacteristic value (cost saving) of the grand coalition is,
𝑐(𝑁) = 12500 + 7900 + 5600 = 34000
𝑣(𝑁) =
∑
𝑖∈𝑁
𝑐(𝑖) − 𝑐(𝑁) = 60000 − 34000 = 26000.
The same steps are repeated for each coalition (with the actuallyavailable lines and sources) to determine all costs and all values of thecharacteristic function (Appendix A, Table A.5).Once the characteristic function is determined, the Shapley-valuesof the players can be determined via Eq. (2):
𝜙(𝑆1) = 6.72⋅103 𝜙(𝑆2) = 4.6⋅103 𝜙(𝐶1) = 7.97⋅103 𝜙(𝐶2) = 6.72⋅103.
4. Data and calculations
Considering the data, our first task is to specify the network weconsider. Our focus is on the international connections; we need tomake a number of simplifications and in the following we outline thesteps we had to take to make the network manageable.
4.1. Network simplifications
In our network model nodes are countries and arcs are internationalpipelines.By ‘‘country’’ we mean a geographical location and the arcs con-necting them are typically combinations of international and nationalpipeline segments. For the geographical location we use the main gasdistribution hub; in Italy, a long country with hubs in the North and theSouth we picked an artificial location near Rome; in Germany, a coun-try with a circular distribution network and multiple hubs we picked anidealized point near Frankfurt. For idealized points pipeline-distancesare estimated. Russia operates with delivery prices. We provided thesourcing costs at the border. There is no benefit in further modifyingto some hypothetical location inside the country and subtracting thecost of internal transportation from the sourcing costs to later add themback during the computations. The same applies to North-Africa, takenas a single player.For computational reasons – the calculation of the Shapley-value isof non-polynomial complexity – we must reduce the number of players,therefore we calculate the values of groups of countries or regions asplayers (Fig. 3).Finally, parallel pipelines connecting the same two countries werecombined into a single pipeline with aggregated capacity and averagelength. Transportation costs were fixed at 1.5 m$/bcm/100 km on eachpipeline.
4.2. Liquefied natural gas
In the past years, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) appeared as a newplayer on the European gas market. Liquefying is an alternative trans-portation method with a very different cost structure: While the re-quired infrastructure is expensive and liquefying and gasifying is ex-pensive, as tankers use the evaporated gas – the loss – from their tanks,distance-related transportation costs are negligible. LNG is a cheapertransportation method for distances beyond 4000 km than deliveringcompressed natural gas (Economides et al., 2006).On the other hand supply depends very much on world marketconditions elsewhere. In the past East-Asia was the strongest LNGmarket, lately more LNG appeared on the European market. Initiallyto serve remote, poorly connected areas, but increasingly to input intothe pipeline network.We include LNG as a new player with zero consumption, a pro-duction corresponding to current LNG imports to Europe and links toevery player with significant LNG terminals. The low transportationcosts would create wormholes in the network, connecting remote nodeswith free pipelines so we shift the LNG source cost to transportationcost by assuming long ‘‘pipelines’’ (see supplementary data in AppendixB). Overall this does not affect the cost of using LNG.
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Fig. 3. Regions for calculating the Shapley-value.
Table 1Sourcing costs and maximum supply by country.Supplier Sourcing cost (m$/bcm) Supplied quantity (bcm)
Algeria 230 64.3Central Asia 200 50.5Denmark 225 1.9Russia 220 192.8Norway 225 118.7LNG 240 56.6backstop source 600 ∞
4.3. Sourcing costs
Table 1 compiles the sourcing costs. We assumed that the Russiangas is somewhat cheaper than the Norwegian and North-African gas.LNG is the most expensive alternative, however, it is still cheap com-pared to the price of the backstop source. Although the Central Asiansourcing cost appears to be lower than the Russian gas, considering thetransfer costs of the circa 2000 km long pipeline that delivers the gas,it is equal in fact to the North-African sourcing cost.
4.4. Backstop sources
When local production and imports are insufficient to cover demandsome of the demand for natural gas must be directed to other energysources. In some cases this may be relatively easy, but in others nearlyimpossible. Ideally such a model should take a detailed replacementcost-function into account. In the absence of such information we havetaken the replacement cost to be 600 m$/bcm. This is 2–3 times higherthan the price of natural gas including transportation costs over themost extreme distances: consuming gas is always preferred even if it isfar from the consumer. Our results proved to be robust to a wide rangeof replacement costs (see Section 6.2).
4.5. Data sources and implementation
Fortunately, developments of the natural gas market are well doc-umented and data concerning national resources like oil and gas arepublished regularly by a number of reliable sources. Transmissioncapacities were compiled from the data sheet provided by the Inter-national Energy Agency (2020). Pipeline lengths were derived fromthe European Natural Gas Network Map published by the European
Table 2Data sources.Data type Sources Homepage
Transmission capacities IEA www.iea.orgPipeline length ENTSOG www.entsog.euProduction/Consumption BP, www.bp.com,IndexMundi www.indexmundi.comData verification EIA, www.eia.gov,HEA www.mekh.hu/home
Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG, 2019).For consumption and production data we relied on the statistical year-book of BP (2019). Missing data were gathered from IndexMundi,which in turn uses CIA Factbook as a source. LNG data were obtainedfrom Rogers et al. (2018) and International Energy Agency (2020). Weused alternative sources to verify our database, like the US EnergyInformation Administration and the private database of HungarianEnergy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority. The reference year waschosen as 2019 since at the time of the analysis this year had the mostcomplete data available. The dataset is provided in Appendix B (for thesources see Table 2).The model was implemented in the OPTI toolbox of MATLAB (Cur-rie and Wilson, 2012), and the linear programming task was solved bythe CLP solver, using the Dual simplex method (Vasilyev and Ivanitskiy,2001).
5. Results
We have made use of a number of simplifications to translatea complex economic, engineering and even political problem into asimple mathematical setting. The calculation of the Shapley-values isbased on the simplified game with 14 players. Beyond an evaluation ofthe current network we have looked at two modifications.Firstly, the 2009 Ukrainian gas crisis, when Russia stopped exportsvia Ukraine was a scary incident for many countries in SoutheasternEurope. More recent events did not reduce Ukrainian–Russian tensionsand the risk of a future crisis remains high. As these pipelines are near-ing the end of their service life, in the absence of refurbishment plans,closing seems inevitable. Our first alternative scenario is therefore thestopping of all Russian (and Central-Asian) gas exports via Ukraine.Perhaps the most important recent and future development of thenetwork is the construction of the Nord Stream, the longest sub-sea
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pipeline in the world, directly connecting Russia and Germany over theBaltic Sea. Nord Stream is already fully operational and its capacity isplanned to be doubled by 2020; our Nord Stream 2 scenario looks atthe network once the pipeline is completed.At last, we consider a combined scenario: what happens if NordStream 2 is fully developed and then the Ukrainian connection is shutdown: with the excess transportation capacities, Russia is likely to shiftgas transports to the more efficient pipeline to save costs even if weignore the geopolitical considerations (Vainio, 2019a,b).Our results showing savings per region are presented in Table 3and visually in Fig. 4. Since the figures exclude own consumption andare showing savings with respect to the estimated backstop costs, theabsolute values are less interesting. What one should look at is thechange in incomes or savings. Substantial changes may have drasticeffects on a country’s consumer gas price and even its financial stability.Shutting down the connection via Ukraine harms Ukraine... but alsoRussia. It clearly affects Central-Eastern Europe negatively, since thisarea is supplied mostly by Russia, via Ukraine. On the other handNorway, Algeria and the LNG suppliers come out positively, since theycan be more competitive. Poland improves its position as an importanttransit country, but Slovakia and the Czech Republic lose this role. Sim-ulations show that the Southeast Europe would have been negativelyaffected without the recently commissioned Turkstream pipeline (seeAppendix B, Table B.7).Expanding Nord Stream brings more Russian gas on the market, butwe also see that some of the gas gets rerouted. Most of the benefit goesto Russia and Germany, while other suppliers and transit countries getcompetitors: Norway gets much cheap Russian gas right at its doorstep,Ukraine, Poland the Czech Republic, and Slovakia on the other hand,can now be bypassed with most of the Russian gas export.It is interesting to see how a combination of these two changeswould affect the players. Since Russia can bypass Ukraine via NordStream, we expect that it becomes less important to maintain the con-nection via Ukraine’s Brotherhood pipeline. We find that the countrythat reaps the benefits again is Germany: it gets a direct connectionto cheap Russian gas, plus it becomes its main distributor in most ofEurope. Central-, and Eastern Europe is harmed, although to differentextent. Poland is less affected, due to the fact that it remains a transitcountry. On the other hand, Ukraine, Central Europe and some part ofthe Balkans are severely harmed in this scenario.If we consider Nord Stream 2 as a certainty and view the closing ofthe Ukrainian route as possibility occurring with some fix probability,then we can take the expected outcome of the Nord Stream 2 andCombined scenarios. Looking at the data like this, Western Europecomes out as winner, while Eastern Europe suffer massive losses. Fromthis viewpoint, the political stance of the protesting Eastern Europeancountries seems perfectly logical.Finally, let us address the validity of the fears expressed by Fischer(2016), Riley (2016) and Vatansever (2017), namely, that Russia willcompletely bypass the Ukrainian transit route. From Table 3 we see thatthe closure of the Ukrainian route would decrease the Shapley-value ofRussia from +7.5% to 0.8%. A fair assumption would be that shouldRussia decide to cease the supply through Ukraine, the Russian naturalgas export revenues would not decline more than 10%. The volume ofRussian export4 in 2017 was around $342 bn from which natural gastook 5.2%, ca. $18 bn. Thus, the potential revenue loss for Russia is atmost $2 bn.In comparison, the Crimean conflict and the ensuing economic sanc-tions cost very likely more. Russian business newspaper, Kommersantestimated5 the yearly cost of integrating Crimea into Russia around$3 bn. The effects of sanctions on Russian GDP is less clear. Kholodilin
4 https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/rus/all/show/2017/.5 https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2425287 (In Russian).
and Netšunajev (2019) found weak evidence that Russian and euroarea GDPs declined as a result of the sanctions. On the other hand,Bloomberg Economics calculated6 that the economy of Russia is morethan 10 percent smaller compared with what might have been expectedat the end of 2013. Admittedly, part of the loss is due to the plummetingoil prices, but 60% of the gap, ca. $137 bn, can be attributed to thesanctions.7 The truth is possibly in between these two estimations.There are other costs, which are hidden or even harder to measurenumerically, e.g. that EU countries supported the suspension of nego-tiations over Russia’s joining the OECD and the International EnergyAgency, for further details see a compilation in Tyll et al. (2018).The point is, the Crimean conflict provided a precedent where Rus-sia was willing to take financial losses to achieve political gains (bothdomestic and international). The question is whether the geopoliticalgains exceed the costs of the closure of the Ukrainian route? In anycase, a credible threat will likely increase the geopolitical influence ofRussia.
6. Discussion
Our analysis uncovers strong predictions on the consequences ofNord Stream 2 — but is also built on a number of assumptions. In thissection we discuss the possible relaxation of these assumptions and asensitivity analysis to a wide range of parameters.
6.1. Relaxing assumptions
We have started our analysis with a series of simplifying assump-tions in Section 3.3. Now we return to these to check if these could berelaxed — in the next subsection we also test the sensitivity to some ofthe assumed parameters.
Transportation costs. The differences between transportation costs isone of the arguments in support of Nord Stream 2 and yet we considerhomogeneous costs. We are also aware of the differences betweenold pipelines and those still in the financing stage. Such differencescould be accounted for artificially by an appropriate adjustment ofpipeline length; a generalization to heterogeneous transportation costsis also feasible. For Nord Stream 2, an optimistic estimate of a 20%cut of transportation costs is equivalent to an 3.6 m$/bcm saving ontransportation costs, which is not a dealmaker for any of the countriesvis-à-vis the Ukraine route. Sensitivity analysis reveals that such achange would alter the bargaining positions by a few decimal points.
Sourcing costs. In our model we assume uniform sourcing costs for allconsumers. Weiner (2016) reports a substantial variance between theRussian export prices which cannot be explained by the difference oftransportation costs alone. Hinchey (2018) concludes that alternativeoptions, such as LNG, increase the consumers’ ability to lower pricesand so, in practice, deals with different consumers may vary consider-ably. From a cooperative game theoretic point of view, however, it doesnot matter which country is successful in the price negotiations. Thevalue of a coalition remains the same no matter whether the supplieror the consumer manages to impose his will. The final transactionalprice will only decide how this value is shared among the cooperatingparties.Our model, where any consumer can buy gas from consumers atthe advertised price is somewhat different from reality. Consumerspurchase gas in two different ways: At commodity exchanges at majorpipeline hubs or – more commonly – via direct long-term contracts forundisclosed prices. For such contracts the supplier takes responsibility
6 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-16/here-s-one-measure-that-shows-sanctions-on-russia-are-working.7 Russia’s GDP in 2013 was $2297 bn (source: https://data.worldbank.org/).
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Fig. 4. Relative benefits per region versus the baseline scenario.
Table 3Relative benefits per region versus the baseline scenario. Base Relative change to base
(m$) Ukraine Nord Stream 2 Combined
SuppliersS1 Russia, Belarus, Central Asia, Finland, Baltics 33 592 −12.1% 7.5% 0.8%S2 Norway, Denmark 17 026 28.5% −14.6% −2.0%S3 Algeria, Libya 8 518 31.6% −5.2% 3.6%S4 LNG 7 673 33.2% −7.0% −0.5%
Western EuropeW1 Germany, Switzerland 18 295 0.0% 13.8% 23.8%W2 UK, Ireland, Benelux 13 605 −2.8% 3.3% 0.7%W3 France 6 859 −13.2% 8.4% 5.0%W4 Spain, Portugal 6 423 −6.6% 1.6% 0.1%W5 Italy 11 114 −9.2% 3.5% − 0.5%
Central Eastern EuropeE1 Ukraine 5 683 −71.8% −30.3% −69.9%E2 Poland 4 040 39.4% −18.2% 0.7%E3 Czech, Slovakia 2 996 −75.0% −22.0% −50.9%E4 Austria, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia 3 206 −60.3% 5.5% −29.3%E5 Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova 11 040 12.6% −1.1% 8.0%
for the delivery reserving transportation capacities. Undisclosed pricesmean that producers may apply favouritism and price discriminationbetween consumers. The European Union is moving towards a moretransparent market similar to the one modelled in this paper.In Section 6.2, we look at an alternative scenario, where all sourcingcosts (except LNG and backstop source) are set to 220 m$/bcm to checkrobustness.
6.2. Robustness analysis
We have performed a sensitivity analysis to see how much theobtained results depend on our modelling assumptions by looking atseven alternative setups:
• All sourcing costs equal to 220;
• Price of the backstop source is increased/decreased by 20%;
• Transportation costs are increased/decreased by 20%;
• Countries are ordered by consumption from the smallest to thelargest one (i.e. in reverse order compared to the baseline);
• Transporting on Nord Stream 2 is 20% cheaper than the uniformtransportation cost.
Rather than presenting figures for these artificial scenarios, in Fig. 5,we compare the changes in Shapley-values between scenarios under thenominal parameters (black marker; data from Table 3) to their rangeunder varied parameters (box).We have found that our results are robust: while each parameterhas a measurable impact on the Shapley-value small variations do notchange our main conclusion. In other words, the drastic shift in thebargaining power of the players is due to the changes in the network,namely the construction of Nord Stream 2 and the possible closure ofthe Ukrainian route.
6.3. Shapley value or nucleolus?
There are several approaches to ‘‘solve’’ cooperative games. Weuse the Shapley-value to calculate the power of the stakeholders. Thenucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) is also a possible choice for measuringpower (Montero, 2013). The nucleolus is obtained through a lexico-graphic optimization process, where the profit of the poorest coalitions
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Fig. 5. Robustness analysis.
are maximized first. In this sense the nucleolus implements a kindof social justice while the Shapley-value rewards productivity, as theplayers’ payoffs depend on their marginal contributions. Thus, it isnot surprising that the Shapley-value proves to be a more reliableindicator of power in distribution networks (Hubert and Ikonnikova,2011; Hubert and Coblani, 2015).
The core of a cooperative game shares the savings in a way thatmakes all coalitions happy, too: the total payoff of any coalition isgreater than or equal to its characteristic value. The Shapley-value iscommonly criticized for not – always – being a core allocation evenif the core is non-empty. In such a case part of the network wouldrefuse cooperation and would form a detached subnetwork reducingthe overall saving. In practice, such a secession is not possible due tothe complex legal framework supporting the pipeline network, but wemay want to eliminate such risks or tensions anyway.The nucleolus always lies inside the core — provided that the coreis nonempty. There are various heuristics that make its computationsimpler than that of the Shapley-value (Solymosi and Sziklai, 2016).For the sake of completeness, we have also computed the nucleoli (Ap-pendix B, Table B.6) using a novel algorithm of Benedek et al. (2020).The result has been verified using the Kohlberg-criteria (Kohlberg,1971).Much like Hubert and Coblani (2015), we have found it difficult tointerpret the numbers: Russia gains power when the Ukrainian routegets closed down, then loses power when the Nord Stream 2 is built?It is also hard to imagine that Norway becomes twelve times morepowerful in the Ukrainian scenario.In two out of the four scenarios the advantage of the nucleolusvanishes as the core of the game is empty, but even if the core isnonempty it may produce counter-intuitive results: The cooperativegame that depicts the gas trade is very similar to a so-called glovegame. In a glove game owners of left (say suppliers) and right-handgloves (consumers) form valuable pairs (trade to reduce costs). In suchgames, the core is strangely biased: The side with the fewer gloves getsall the value. In our story, as the Ukrainian route and Nord Stream 2gets switched on and off, the model alternates between over- andundersupply, which in turn might swing any core-based solution fromone extreme to the other.Another possible explanation is that the nucleolus focuses on thesatisfaction of coalitions without considering their size. For instance,the satisfaction of Poland, and its complement coalition (the rest ofthe countries) are treated equally important. Variants of the nucleolus,the so-called per-capita nucleolus (Grotte, 1970), which considers thesatisfactions of coalitions normalized by their sizes or the proportionalnucleolus (Young et al., 1982), which considers relative satisfaction,might be more suitable for such games if one insist on having a corebased solution.
7. Conclusion and policy implications
One interpretation of our result is that each country in Europeis governed by self interest. The past positions/actions taken by thecountries strengthen this analysis. Jirušek (2020) inspects the attitudeof Visegrád countries towards the Nord Stream 2 project and concludesthat despite the declared unity, the Visegrád Group members pursuetheir own goals determined by economic interests or long-standingforeign policy stance.Russia and Germany are the main beneficiaries and supporters ofthe Nord Stream 2 project. Northeast Europe, namely, Poland, Ukraine,Czech Republic and Slovakia oppose it because they will lose theiradvantage as transit countries. Central- and Eastern Europe fear that theconstruction of Nord Stream 2 will ultimately result in closing down theUkrainian route in which case there will be a shortage of cheap Russiangas in the region. The Southeastern part is less affected thanks to the re-cently commissioned Turkstream pipeline. Without Turkstream, Turkeyand neighbouring countries would have been in a much more difficultposition in the case of a supply disruption via Ukraine. Network flowsshow, that even if Nord Stream 2 would provide significantly cheapergas, the benefits would never reach the Eastern part of Europe. A way tomaintain solidarity would be to introduce a compensation scheme or tosupport the construction of a pipeline in the direction of the cancelledNabucco or South Stream pipelines.
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Table 4Possible pipeline projects. Capacities (cap.) in bcm; date of commission.Name Source Destination Integrate with Cap. Date
TANAP+ Georgia/Turkey Turkey/Greece SCP, TAP, Tesla? 15 n.a.TAP Turkey/Greece Italy TANAP, Turkstream? 10–20 2020IAP Albania Croatia TAP 5 n.a.Tesla Turkey Austria Turkstream, TANAP? 27 n.a.TCP Turkmenistan Azerbaijan SCP 30 n.a.Persian Iran Turkey TANAP? 37–40 n.a.East Med Israel Greece/Italy Cyprian gas fields 9–12 n.a.
One cannot but wonder if Nord Stream 2 and similar, somewhatcontroversial developments are consequences of the changes in thedecision making in the Council of the European Union under the LisbonTreaty (Kóczy, 2012). The changes increased the Council’s ability toact, but also along the interest of a smaller majority than before. Thechanges have not affected all countries equally, medium sized countriestypically losing some of their power. While under earlier, Nice-rulescountries harmed by the project had formed a blocking minority, underthe new voting rules they do not.It is worth considering how the situation in the European gas marketmay change in the near future. The substantial investment costs, theinterstate nature of pipeline projects and rapidly changing geopoliticalinterests make the gas network development very volatile. Hubert andCoblani (2015) analyse, among others, the impact of the Nabucco andSouth Stream projects, but by the time of publication both projects wereofficially cancelled. Declining inland production and the need to in-crease supply security, forces EU decision makers to commit themselveson further developing the European gas network. Consequently thereis no shortage of project plans, but not all are equally viable. Table 4summarizes the potential projects.The most promising alternative of Russian gas is to connect CentralAsian gas fields with the European market. The Southern Gas Corridorconsist of three independent pipeline segment: the South CaucasusPipeline (SCP), the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), andthe Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The SCP connects the Shah Deniz gasfield of Azerbaijan, through Georgia, to the Eastern edge of Turkey. TAPstarts from the Turkish/Greek border and runs to Italy, first through Al-bania, then under the Adriatic Sea. The recently commissioned TANAPruns through Turkey connecting SCP and TAP. Although SCP has 25bcm annual capacity, TANAP can only transmit 16 bcm, which is littlemore than half of Western Turkey’s net gas demand. It is unlikelythat TAP will run dry though, as Turkey aims to increase TANAP’scapacity to 22 bcm based on demand, and to 31 bcm immediately afterwith additional investments8 and [Turkstream also became operationalrecently]. Turkstream will also supply the Tesla pipeline which in turnis planned to link the Black Sea with the Baumgarten gas hub in Austria.The Ionian Adriatic Pipeline (IAP) would connect TAP with the plannedLNG terminal in Krk, Croatia.Turkmenistan has the largest proven reserves of natural gas inCentral Asia, 9.4% of the world total. The planned Trans CaspianPipeline (TCP) would help to feed the SCP. The traditional route forTurkmen gas to Europe is through Russia, which is supposedly nothappy of the prospect of having a competitor. Let us note that all theTurkmen pipelines are owned by Gazprom.Iran possesses even larger reserves, 18% of the world total, andproduces more gas than Qatar. However, it consumes nearly all of it.Now and then there are rumours of the Persian Pipeline that would runparallel with TAP and TANAP, but Iran has to invest in its productionfirst, as they already have a gas pipeline to Turkey, which they are yetunable to fill.
8 https://www.tanap.com/media/news/turkey-historic-tanap-gas-pipeline-project-goes-live/.
Although the production in Europe is declining, this is not truefor all countries. Romania may soon become a net exporter due tothe increasing production on the Black Sea. The Middle-East mightbe another supply source. Apart from Iran, Egypt and Israel can alsobecome potential producers. The former due to the discovery of thegiant Zohr gas field, the latter due to rapidly developing gas industryin the Levantine Basin.Meanwhile market diversification is not only important for Europe.Russia also made efforts to protect itself from disruptions. Visenescu(2018) reports that Russia is shifting its attention towards ASEANmarkets. Ozawa et al. (2019) argue that the recently inaugurated Powerof Siberia pipeline can have the double positive effect of creating moreinterstate stability between Russia and China plus greater regional andinternational power for Russia as the emerging main supplier for theAsia Pacific Region.The profitability of these developments rests on many factors. No-tably oil and LNG prices in general, which in turn depend on thedemand in Asia, and the costs of the production of shale gas in theUS (Rogers, 2015). Game theoretic analysis of the different scenarioscan help us deciding which projects will be realized in the future.
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Appendix A. Numerical example
Table A.5The cost and characteristic function values of the example in Section 3.6.
𝑆 𝑐(𝑆) 𝑣(𝑆) 𝑆 𝑐(𝑆) 𝑣(𝑆) 𝑆 𝑐(𝑆) 𝑣(𝑆)
{𝑆1} 0 0 {𝑆1 , 𝐶1} 42 000 0 {𝑆1 , 𝐶1 , 𝐶2} 38 800 21 200
{𝑆2} 0 0 {𝑆1 , 𝐶2} 6900 11 100 {𝑆2 , 𝐶1 , 𝐶2} 46 400 13 600
{𝐶1} 42 000 0 {𝑆2 , 𝐶1} 28 400 13 600 {𝑆1 , 𝑆2 , 𝐶1} 28 400 13 600
{𝐶2} 18 000 0 {𝑆2 , 𝐶2} 18 000 0 {𝑆1 , 𝑆2 , 𝐶2} 6900 11 100
{𝑆1 , 𝑆2} 0 0
{∅} 0 0 {𝐶1 , 𝐶2} 60 000 0 {𝑁} 34 000 26 000
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Table B.6Relative benefits per region versus the baseline scenario using the nucleolus as a power measure.Base Relative change to base
(m$) Ukraine Nord Stream 2 Combined
Suppliers
S1: Russia, Belarus, Central Asia, 24 567 0.5% 0.7% −6.9%Finland, BalticsS2: Norway, Denmark 1 668 1191.8% −39.3% 80.4%S3: Algeria, Libya 1 970 2.9% −4.5% 10.3%S4: LNG 1 902 3.1% −7.6% 0.3%
Western EuropeW1: Germany, Switzerland 27 116 −22.0% 1.0% 8.8%W2: UK, Ireland, Benelux 22 671 −41.3% 1.4% −6.2%W3: France 14 777 −51.7% 1.8% 0.1%W4: Spain, Portugal 9 831 −31.8% 1.3% 0.0%W5: Italy 21 489 −37.1% 0.5% −1.1%
Central- Eastern- EuropeE1: Ukraine 2 436 −21.2% −9.7% −23.2%E2: Poland 3 155 88.3% 0.2% 2.5%E3: Czech Republic, Slovakia 2 303 −29.0% −2.4% −5.2%
E4: Austria, Hungary, 3 834 −24.6% −1.2% −14.4%Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia
E5: Turkey, Greece, 12 347 −2.4% 0.0% −0.3%Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova
Table B.7Relative benefits per region versus the baseline scenario in 2016.Base Relative change to base
(m$) Ukraine Nord Stream 2 Combined
Suppliers
S1: Russia(+Belarus), Central Asia, 29 430 −16.1% 7.2% −2.5%Finland, BalticsS2: Norway, Denmark 15 451 33.1% −14.4% −2.7%S3: Algeria(+Libya) 7 964 34.6% −4.6% 5.1%S4: LNG 5 253 37.5% −5.7% −0.5%
Western EuropeW1: Germany(+Switzerland) 17 953 8.0% 11.7% 30.4%W2: UK(+Ireland), Benelux 11 206 2.8% 3.0% 1.5%W3: France 6 968 −11.9% 7.0% 4.1%W4: Spain+Portugal 6 022 −5.2% 1.3% 0.0%W5: Italy 10 359 −9.3% 3.2% −1.0%
Central- Eastern- andSouthern EuropeE1: Ukraine 5 495 −86.5% −27.2% −78.9%E2: Poland 3 326 59.2% −19.0% 9.5%E3: Czech Republic, Slovakia 2 755 −58.7% −18.8% −25.8%
E4: Austria, Hungary, 3 257 −62.8% 6.1% −32.4%Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia
E5: Turkey, Greece, 7 271 −1.9% −1.1% −0.3%Bulgaria, Romania(+Moldova)
Pipeline and LNG data can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111692.
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